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Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Auction Mechanisms
for Resource Allocation
Yu-E Sun, He Huang , Xiang-Yang Li, Yang Du, Miaomiao Tian, Hongli Xu, and Mingjun Xiao
Abstract: In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-the-art solutions have
been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources. However, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer
is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. Besides the
privacy-preserving issue, the performance guarantee of social efficiency maximization is also crucial for auction
mechanism design. In this paper, we study the auction mechanisms that consider the above two aspects. We
discuss two multi-unit auction models: the identical multiple-items auction and the distinct multiple-items auction.
Since the problem of determining a multi-unit auction mechanism that can maximize its social efficiency is NPhard, we design a series of nearly optimal multi-unit auction mechanisms for the proposed models. We prove that
the proposed auction mechanisms are strategyproof. Moreover, we also prove that the privacy of bid value from
each bidder can be preserved in the auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work
on the strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms that simultaneously consider privacy preservation and social
efficiency maximization. The extensive simulations show that the proposed mechanisms have low computation and
communication overheads.
Key words: approximation mechanism; multi-unit auction; privacy preserving; social efficiency; strategyproof
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Introduction

Resource allocation is one of the most important
issues in many areas. Typical examples include
the virtual machine resource allocation in cloud
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computing, spectrum resource allocation in wireless
communications, and so on. Since an auction is a
fair and efficient resource allocation in the real world,
it has also been introduced into the networking area,
especially for scarce resource allocations. By far, many
auction mechanisms have been designed for different
resource allocation problems, such as the computing
resources in the cloud[1] , spectrum licenses[2–4] , cellular
networks[5] , and CRNs[6] .
Strategyproofness (a.k.a., truthfulness) is regarded as
one of the key objectives in the auction mechanism
design, which means that the optimal strategy for
bidders is to bid their true valuations of the items for
sale. Most of the auction mechanisms are designed to
charge each winner a minimum bid value, by which she
can win the auction, to ensure the strategyproofness of
the bidders[7] . Unfortunately, the auctioneer may not
always be trustworthy. Once the true valuation of each
bidder is revealed to an untrustworthy auctioneer, he
may take advantage of it to maximize his profits. For
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instance, suppose you value some items at $100, and
submit the true valuation to the auctioneer in a sealedbid auction. Actually, the minimum bid value that you
will win in the auction is $50. However, the auctioneer
is willing to charge you $99 to maximize the profits,
instead of charging you $50 for strategyproofness. In
this situation, will you still submit your true valuation
to the auctioneer?
To address the above problem, the bid values should
be hidden throughout the whole procedure of the
auction. Thus, protecting the privacy of bids should
be regarded as an attractive objective in the design of
auction mechanisms. In recent years, some researchers
have dedicated their efforts in the auction mechanism
design to privacy preservation. For instance, in Refs. [8,
9], the authors designed mechanisms to protect the bid
value in the first-price and the second-price sealedbid auctions. Huang et al.[10] proposed a strategyproof
and bid privacy-preserving auction mechanism for
spectrum allocation. Pan et al.[11, 12] gave a secure
combinatorial spectrum auction by using homomorphic
encryption to deal with the untrustworthy auctioneer.
However, none of these privacy-preserving auction
mechanisms provided any performance guarantee on
social efficiency, i.e., the total bid value of winners,
which is a standard and critical auction metric[13, 14] .
In this paper, we focus on the privacy-preserving and
strategyproof auction mechanism design for resource
allocation, which can simultaneously maximize the
social efficiency. We observe that most of the existing
auction mechanisms fail to consider the multiple-items
trading. Nevertheless, bidders in practical applications
may often express their preferences for a specified
number of items or some specified bundles of items,
instead of an individual item. This kind of auction is
called as the multi-unit auction. There are two types
of multi-unit auctions, in which the items to be sold
are identical or distinct. In this paper, we will propose
two auction mechanisms to manage the identical case
and the distinct case, respectively. For the identical
case, the demand of each bidder is a fixed number of
items, which is inseparable. For example, if a cloud
computing job requires 35 time slices, the bidder must
auction off at least 35 time slices. It is meaningless to
win an auction with less than 35 time slices. The auction
of distinct items is also known as a combinatorial
auction. In a combinatorial auction, all bidders can
bid for bundles of items rather than individual items[15] .
For instance, if a user wants to run a cloud application
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by using 130 CPUs and 8 GB of storage from 8AM
to 10AM, the user will only be interested in the
entire bundle of resources for meeting the demand. In
addition, the bid value and the required items of each
bidder are private and sensitive information of auctions,
since the auctioneer might raise the price in future
auctions to maximize the profit after learning these
information. Hence, we need to protect the privacy
of these sensitive information throughout the whole
auction. Meanwhile, we also need to let the auctioneer
know each winner’s demand so that the auction can be
completed.
Designing a multi-unit auction mechanism with the
maximum social efficiency is an NP-hard problem[16] .
Many efficient approximation algorithms have been
proposed for both the Identical items Auction model
(IA model) and Combinatorial Auctions model (CA
model). For example, there is a Polynomial Time
Approximation Scheme (PTAS), which is suitable for
the IA auction model, as well as an approximation
p
algorithm with an approximation factor of h that has
been proved to be a tight one for the CA. Our work is
not to design approximation algorithms to improve the
performance of the existing studies, but to construct the
mechanisms with privacy preservation, based on these
existing approximation mechanisms.
However, the computation burden, which relies on
the bid values of bidders, is too heavy in the existing
approximation algorithms with good performance
guarantee. Thus, the task of designing privacypreserving auction mechanisms while guaranteeing
high performance is very challenging. To tackle this
problem, we introduce an agent into our auction model,
which is a semi-trusted third-party and can help the
auctioneer to decide the winners and compute their
charges. In our design, the auctioneer generates a
public key and a secret key of Paillier’s homomorphic
cryptosystem. Bidders encrypt their bids by using the
public key. Then, the agent performs homomorphic
computation on the ciphertexts, adds random numbers,
and sends the results to the auctioneer for making an
allocation decision and computing the payment of the
winners. Such a design ensures the privacy protection
without affecting the correctness of the auctions.
Moreover, the extra costs incurred by this design are
negligible. The whole auction mechanisms still have
low computation and communication overheads.
Although there exists a PTAS for the IA model,
it is a very challenging work to design a privacy-
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preserving version of PTAS. We propose a privacypreserving bid mechanism with an approximation factor
of 2. For the combinatorial auction, we provide a
privacy-preserving version of the auction mechanism
proposed p
in Ref. [17], which has an approximation
factor of h. We prove that our new method for CA
can protect both the bid values of all bidders and the
items that each loser wants to buy. To the best of our
knowledge, the auction mechanisms presented in this
paper are the first strategyproof and privacy-preserving
multi-unit auction mechanisms with a social efficiency
performance guarantee.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
2 introduces some necessary preliminaries. Section 3
designs an approximately optimal social efficiency and
privacy-preserving strategyproof auction mechanism
for identical items. In Section 4, we further introduce a
combinatorial auction with privacy-preserving. Section
5 evaluates the performance of our approach. Section 6
discusses the related literature and Section 7 concludes
the paper.

2

Model, Problem, and Preliminaries

In this section, we first briefly introduce the auction
system model. Then, we illustrate the necessary
economic property of an auction mechanism and state
our auction design targets in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3,
we review the cryptographic tools used in this paper.
2.1

Auction model

In recent years, auctions have been deemed as a
preeminent means to allocate resources in many areas.
Many resource allocation problems can directly be seen
as (resource) auction problems. In general, our auction
design is not limited to a concrete resource allocation
problem. Here we directly present the auction model,
which can manage many resource allocation problems.
Consider a sealed-bid auction, as shown in Fig. 1, in
which there exists an auctioneer, a set of bidders, and an
agent. At the beginning of the auction, all the bidders
first encrypt their bids by using the public key generated
from the agent, and then submit their encrypted bids to
the auctioneer. Next, the auctioneer allocates the items
to the bidders, and decides the charges for the winners
after communicating with the agent. We assume that the
agent is a semi-trusted third-party, who is curious about
the bid values of the bidders, but will not collude with
the auctioneer.
We study two auction models in this paper: IA

Fig. 1
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Secure auction model.

model and CA model. In the IA model, we assume
that there exists a set of identical items denoted as
I D fI1 ; I2 ; :::; Ih g, and m bidders denoted by B D
f1; 2; :::; mg in the market. Each bidder i is only
interested in a fixed number of items, denoted by Ni ,
and is willing to pay no more than vi for all items. In
the CA model, the items in the market are distinct, and
each bidder i 2 B wants to buy the items in a specified
subset ci  I . Note that in both the IA model and the
CA model, the demand of each bidder is inseparable,
which means that bidder i will get all the items that he
wants to buy if he wins.
2.2

Auction goals

The goals of our auction mechanism are two-fold:
(1) the proposed auction mechanism should preserve
some economic properties, such as strategyproof and
social efficiency maximization; and (2) the auction
mechanism should preserve the privacy of bidders. The
detailed description follows.
Our primary goal is to design a strategyproof auction
mechanism which can maximize the social efficiency.
We define the social efficiency of an auction as the total
bid values of the winning bidders. Suppose bi , vi , and
pi are the bid value, true valuation, and the payment of
bidder i for all the items he wants to buy, respectively.
Then, the utility of bidder i is defined as
(
vi pi ; if bidder i wins the auctionI
ui D
(1)
0;
otherwise
Strategyproofness is often regarded as one of the
most crucial properties of auction mechanisms. We say
an auction is strategyproof if bidding truthfully is the
dominant strategy for each bidder. Therefore, we need
to prove that for each bidder i , ui is maximized when
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bi D vi to ensure the strategyproofness of bidders.
It has been proven by Myerson that an auction
is strategyproof, if and only if the following two
conditions hold:
 Bid-monotone Constraint: The items allocation
mechanism is bid-monotone, which means that,
when bidder i wins the auction by bidding bi , he will
always win by bidding bi0 > bi .
 Critical value Constraint: The charge from a
winner i is his critical value, i.e., the minimum bid
that he will win the auction.
Following this direction, we design the strategyproof
auction mechanisms to satisfy the above-mentioned
characteristics.
The privacy goals of our auction mechanisms are as
follows:
 In the IA model, we protect the bid values of bidders,
which means that all bids from bidders are blind to
both the auctioneer and the agent.
 In the CA model, neither the auctioneer nor the agent
knows the true bid values of bidders. Nor do they
know which items each loser wants to get.
2.3

Paillier’s
homomorphic
cryptosystem

encryption

We use a 1024-bit length Paillier’s homomorphic
encryption system in this paper, which satisfies the
following homomorphic operations:
E.msg1 /E.msg2 / D E.msg1 C msg2 /;
E.msg1 /msg2 D E.msg1 msg2 /;
where E.msgi / is the ciphertext of message msgi .
To facilitate reading, we summarize some symbols
that are used in this paper in Table 1.
2.4

Application scenario illustration

In this subsection, we illustrate two typical application
scenarios for the IA model and the CA model,
respectively.
For the IA model, we consider the virtual
machine resource allocation in cloud computing. In
an infrastructure-as-a-service cloud, the computation
resources (e.g., CPU, RAM, disk) have been packed
into some virtual machines. Cloud users can request
some virtual machines to run their computational
tasks. For example, Amazon EC2 can provide seven
categories and 23 types of virtual machines. When
EC2 users want to request some virtual machines
of the same type, the corresponding virtual machine
allocation problem will fall into the IA model, and can

Table 1

Some symbols used in this paper.

Symbol

Meaning

I, B
h, m
Ni , ci

The set of items and bidders in the auction
The number of items and bidders in the auction
The number / combination of items bidder i
wants to buy
The true valuation, bid value, and payment of
bidder i for all the items he wants to buy
The utility of bidder i
The encrypt key and decrypt key of the agent
The ciphertext of message msg
The bidder with rank i in the sorted bid set
The permutation for the ID of bidders and items
The demand vector of bidder i , where xi;j D 1
if bidder i wants to buy item Ij ;
otherwise xi;j D 0

vi , bi , pi
ui
EK;DK
E.msg/
i0
1 , 2
Xi , xi;j

be solved by our proposed auction mechanism. Most
existing studies focus on the storage and computational
privacy in cloud computing. Only a few studies
consider the bid privacy in the process of the resource
allocation of cloud computing. None of them likes our
solution considers strategyproofness, privacy, and the
performance guarantee simultaneously.
For the CA model, we consider a spectrum
auction scenario where the spectrum channels are
heterogeneous, due to the different frequencies,
bandwidths, and licensed areas. All the spectrum
channels in the market are viewed as items in the
CA model. The new spectrum demanders are viewed
as the bidders. Each bidder i needs a combination of
spectrum channels, which is ci in the CA model. Then,
the spectrum auction problem in this setting is exactly
a concrete CA problem. Spectrum auctions have been
widely studied in recent years, but only a few studies
consider the privacy-preserving issue in their work. To
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to
provide a strategyproof and privacy-preserving solution
for the combinatorial spectrum auction problem.

3

Identical Items Auction Mechanism
Design with Privacy Preservation (IAMP)

In this section, we propose an IAMP design, which
achieves an approximately optimal social efficiency and
supports privacy preservation. Our auction mechanism
mainly consists of three steps: bidding, allocation, and
payment calculation.
3.1

Bidding

Before running the auction, the agent first generates
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an encryption key EK and a decryption key DK of
Paillier’s cryptosystem. Then, the agent publishes EK
as a public key, and keeps DK private. We assume
that the parameter n is 1024-bit length in this work.
Each bidder i encrypts the bid bi to E.bi /, and sends
.E.bi /; Ni / to the auctioneer, where Ni is the number
of items that he wants to buy.
3.2

Allocation mechanism

After receiving the encrypted bids from the bidders,
the auctioneer needs to decide on the winner aiming
to maximize the social efficiency. However, the social
efficiency maximization problem can be reduced to the
Knapsack Problem, which is a well-known NP-hard
problem. To address this NP-hard problem, a PTAS has
been proposed in Ref. [18], which is also suitable for
our model. Unfortunately, there is a large computation
and comparison overload in this PTAS, since it is based
on dynamic programming. It is very difficult to design
a bid privacy preservation version based on this PTAS.
Therefore, we build our privacy-preserving method
based on another approximation algorithm, which can
approximate the optimal allocation within a factor of 2.
The main idea of the approximation method we used
is depicted as follows:
(1) We first sort the per-unit bid values of bidders in
non-increasing order:
b.1/
b .i /
b .m/
> ::: >
> ::: >
(2)
N.1/
N .i /
N .m/
where .i/ is the i -th bidder in the sorted bid set.
(2) Then, we find the critical bidder  .k/, which
satisfies
k
k
X1
X
N .i / 6 h 6
N .i /
(3)
i D1

This completes our proof.

The details of our allocation mechanism with privacy
preservation is depicted in Algorithm 1. First, we sort
the per-unit bid values of bidders to decide the winners.
To address the issue of privacy-preserving, bidders first
encrypt their bids using the encryption key of the agent,
and submit the encrypted bids to the auctioneer. Then,
the auctioneer masks them by using two random values
ı1 2 Z2 1 and ı2 2 Z2 2 as ı1 bi C ı2 Ni . Note that
the range Œ1; 2 1  and Œ1; 2 2  for ı1 and ı2 should be
selected based on the consideration of the correctness of
the modular operations: ı1 bi C ı2 Ni should be smaller
than the modulo used in Paillier’s system. Since the
agent has the decryption key, he can compute and sort
bi
ı1 N
C ı2 into non-increasing order without accessing
i
any true bid values of the bidders. Furthermore, the
Algorithm 1
Allocation mechanism for identical items
model
1: The auctioneer randomly picks two integers ı1 2 Z21012 ,
ı2 2 Z21022 , and executes the homomorphic operation:
E.ı1 bi C ı2 Ni / D E.bi /ı1 E.ı2 Ni /:
2:

3:

4:

Then, the auctioneer maps the ID of bidders by
using permutation  W Zm ! Zm , and sends fE.ı1 bi C
ı2 Ni /; Ni ; .i/gi 2B to the agent.
The agent decrypts E.ı1 bi C ı2 Ni / by using his private key
bi
DK D .; /, then computes ı1
C ı2 and sorts bi =Ni in
Ni
non-increasing order.
b.m/
b.1/
> ::: >
:
N.1/
N.m/
bi
bj
bi
bj
Obviously,
>
if ı1
C ı2 > ı1
C ı2 .
Ni
Nj
Ni
Nj
The agent finds the critical bidder .k/ by computing:
k
X1

iD1

where h is the number of items in the market.
k
X1
(3) If
b.i/ > b .k/ , then the top k 1 bidders
i D1

in the sorted bid set win the auction; otherwise, bidder
.k/ wins.
Lemma 1 The proposed algorithm can
approximate 1=2 of the optimal algorithm.
Proof Suppose O is the X
set of bidders in the
optimal solution, and w.O/ D
bi . Obviously,
w.O/ 6

i 2O
k
X

b .i /

N.i/ 6 h 6

i D1

5:

6:

k
X

N.i/ :

iD1

To decide the winners, the agent sends .f.i/gi<k ; .k// to
the auctioneer, where f.i/gi<k is out of order.
The auctioneer randomly picks two integers ı3 2 Z21012 ,
ı4 2 Z21022 , computes the following and sends the result
back to the agent.
E.ı3

k
X1
iD1

kY1

b.i/ C ı4 / D .

E.b.i/ //ı3 E.ı4 /;

iD1

E.ı3 b.k/ C ı4 / D E.b.k/ /ı3 E.ı4 /:

(4)

After receiving the ciphertexts, the agent decrypts them, and
k
X1
sends f.i/gi<k to the auctioneer if
b.i/ > b.k/ ;

(5)

otherwise, the agent sends .k/ to the auctioneer.
The auctioneer chooses the bidders that the agent sends to
him as winners, and sets other bidders as losers.

7:

i D1

i D1

Then, we can easily obtain
k
k
X1
1X
1
w.O/ 6
b .i / 6 max.
b .i / ; b .k/ /
2
2
i D1

123

i D1

8:
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auctioneer also maps the true ID of the bidders by using
a permutation before sending fE.ı1 bi C ı2 Ni /; Ni gi 2B
to the agent. Thus, the agent cannot map the masked
bids fı1 bi C ı2 Ni gi 2B to the bidders either. Then, we
need to find the bidders with the top k 1 per-unit
bids and the bidder with the k-th per-unit bid. The
agent can do this easily with the sorted per-unit bids.
Next, the agent sends the permutated ID of the bidders
with the top k per-unit bids to the auctioneer. Then,
the auctioneer computes the encrypted bid sum of the
bidders with the top k 1 per-unit bids. Since the agent
has the decryption key, the auctioneer then randomly
chooses two integers, ı3 and ı4 , to hide the true value of
k
X1
E.
b.i/ / and E.b .k/ /, and communicates with the
i D1

agent to judge which one is bigger and further decides
the winning bidders.
Next, we will show that our allocation mechanism for
the IA model is bid-monotone.
Lemma 2 The proposed allocation mechanism is
bid-monotone, which means that if bidder  .i / wins by
bidding b.i/ , he will always win by bidding b0 .i / >
b.i/ .
Proof In our allocation mechanism, we set the
bidder .k/ to win the auction, or the bidders with
the top k 1 per-unit bids to win the auction. In the
case of bidder .k/ winning the auction, we can easily
k
X1
get b.k/ >
b .i / . When bidder  .k/ increases
i D1

his bid from b.k/ to b0 .k/ > b .k/ , obviously, both
0
b.k/
>

k
X1

b.i/ and b0 .k/ > max.b .i / ji < k/ hold.

i D1

Thus, bidder .k/ will always win no matter whether
0
b.k/
is the k-th highest per-unit bid or not.
N.k/
In the case of the bidders with the top k 1 perunit bids winning the auction, the bidders who are in
the bidder set with the top k 1 per-unit bids remain
unchanged when any of the k 1 bidders increase their
bid. Suppose bidder  .j / increases his bid to b0 .j / , we
can easily get that

jX
1
i D1

b .i / C b0 .j / C

k
X1

b .i / is still

i Dj C1

larger than b.k/ . Thus, the bidders with the top k
bids will also win the auction.
This completes our proof.
3.3

1


Payment calculation mechanism

It has been proven that an auction is strategyproof if

and only if its winner determination mechanism is bidmonotone and it always charges each winner its critical
value. We have proved that our allocation mechanism
is bid-monotone, which indicates that there exists a
critical value for each winner. Hence, the objective of
this step is to compute the critical values of the winners
with privacy preservation.
Since our allocation mechanism is bid-monotone,
there must exist some intervals denoted by ŒLi ; Ui ,
which satisfy that bidder  .i / wins the auction provided
the bidder’s per-unit bid value is larger than the Li -th
per-unit bid value in the sorted bid list and always loses
if the bidder’s per-unit bid value is less than the Ui -th
per-unit bid value. Here, ŒLi ; Ui  is the critical interval
of the winner  .i / if Li D Ui 1. It is not difficult to
see that i is the lower bound of Li , and f is the upper
bound of Ui which satisfies:
f
X1
i D1

N .i / 6 h 6

f
X

N .i /

(6)

i D1

Obviously, the critical value of each winner .i/ is
less than the Li -th bid value, and larger than the Ui th bid value. To find the critical value of each winner,
we first compute their critical intervals. As shown in
Algorithm 2, we use a binary search to compute the
critical interval for each winner  .i /. In each round
of the binary search, we set the per-unit bid of bidder
 .i / equal to the per-unit bid of the M -th bidder in the
sorted list, and then compare the bid sum of the new top
k 1 bids and the k-th bid, to check whether  .i/ with
the new bid value will win or not. This can be achieved
since the auctioneer can compute the encrypted value
E.b .M / N .i / /, which is equal to E.b .i / N .M / /, and
the auctioneer can further obtain the encrypted values
k
X1
of E.
b .j / N .M / / and E.b .k/ N .M / / through
j D1

homomorphic operations. With these encrypted values,
the agent can check whether bidder  .i / won or not,
k
X1
by decrypting and comparing the values
b .j / and
j D1

b .k/ . Then, the agent can obtain the new boundary
for the binary search, until the critical interval of bidder
 .i / is found.
After obtaining the critical interval of each winner,
we compute their critical values. For the case that
winner  .i / is the new k-th bidder, and the per-unit
bid value is smaller than the Li -th, but larger than the
Ui -th per-unit bid value in the sorted list, we compute
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Algorithm 2 Compute the critical interval for winner σ (i)
1: The agent first computes the interval of the binary search
Œi; f , and sets L D i , U D f at the beginning. Then, he
sets M D b.U C L/=2c.


2: The agent sends the IDs .f .j / gj <k ;  .M /;  .k/ / to the

auctioneer, where f .j / gj <k is out of order,  .j / and
 .k/ are the new bidders with the j -th and k-th per-unit
b.M / N.i/
, respectively.
bid value when  .i / bids
N.M /
3: The auctioneer first sets the bid of bidder  .i / in this round
of binary search by setting E.b.i/ N.M / / as

Algorithm 3 Payment calculation for winner σ (i)

1: if .i/ D .k/ then
2:
The auctioneer randomly chooses two integers ı5 2
Z21012 , ı6 2 Z21022 , computes the following and sends
the results to the agent.
Yk 1
E.ı6 C ı5 s1 / D E.ı6 /.
E.b.j / //ı5 ;
j D0

E.ı6 N.Ui / C ı5 s2 / D E.ı6 N.Ui / /E.b.Ui / /ı5 N .i / :
3:

Then, the auctioneer randomly chooses two integers ıM;1 2
Z21012 , ıM;2 2 Z21022 , computes the following, and sends
the results back to the agent.
Xk 1
E.ıM;2 N.M / C ıM;1
b.j / N.M / /

4:
5:

E.ı6 N.Ui / C ı5 .s2 C s1 N.Ui / / D

E.b.j / //N .M / ıM;1 ;

Yk
E.ı6 N.Ui / /.E.b.Ui / /E.

j D0

Yk
E.ı7 C ı5 s1 / D E.ı7 /E.

E.ıM;2 N.M / /E.b.k/ /N .M / ıM;1 :

5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:

the critical value p .i / of winner  .i / as follows:
k
X1

b .j / ;

j D1

b .Ui / N .i /
N .Ui /

/:

In the other case, the critical value of winner  .i / is
k
X1
b .Ui / N .i /
pi 0 D max.b.k/ C b .i /
b .j / ;
/:
N .Ui /
j D1

Assume that s1 D

k
X1

1

j D0

The agent decrypts the received ciphertexts and checks
b.M / N.i/
, then
if bidder  .i / win or not by bidding
N.M /
executes the following operation.
b.M / N.i/
then
if  .i / wins by bidding
N.M /
The agent sets L D M , and M D b.U C L/=2c;
else
The agent sets U D M , and M D b.U C L/=2c;
end if
Repeat Steps 2 8 until U D L C 1.
; Ui  is the
D L, then ŒL
The agent sets Ui D U , and L
i
i
critical interval of winner  .i /.

p.i/ D max.

1

j D0

E.ıM;2 N.M / C ıM;1 b.k/ N.M / / D

4:

else
The auctioneer randomly chooses two integers ı5 2
Z21012 , ı6 ; ı7 2 Z21022 , computes the following, and
sends the results to the agent.
E.ı6 C ı5 s3 / D E.ı6 /.E.b.k/ /E.b.i/ //ı5 ;

j D0

kY1

0
The agent computes and sends p.i/
to the auctioneer,
where
0
p.i/
D max.ı6 C ı5 s1 ; ı6 C ı5 s2 =N.Ui / /:

E.b.i/ N.M / / D E.b.M / /N .i / :

E.ıM;2 N.M / /.
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b .j / , s2 D b .Ui / N .i / , and

j D1

s3 D b.k/ C b .i / . The details of our payment
calculation mechanism with privacy preservation are
described in Algorithm 3.
We have proved that our allocation mechanism is bidmonotone, and we charge each winner their respective
critical value, thus we can also obtain Algorithm 1.

6:

E.b.j / ///ı5 N .i / ;

E.b.j / //ı5 :

0
After receiving the ciphertext, the agent computes p.i/
and sends it to the auctioneer, where
0
p.i/
D max.ı6 ı7 Cı5 .s3 s1 /; ı6 ı7 Cı5 s2 =N.Ui / /:

7:
8:

end if
The auctioneer sets the payment of winner i 0 is pi 0 , where
pi 0 D .pi0 0

ı6 C ı7 /=ı5 :

Theorem 1 The auction mechanism we proposed is
strategyproof.
Since the goal of this work is to design a
strategyproof auction mechanism with privacy
preservation, we will show that the proposed IAMP
protects the true bid values of bidders in the next
subsection.
3.4

Security analysis

The most important target of our auction mechanism is
to protect the bid values of the bidders. There are two
main parties in our mechanism, the auctioneer and the
agent. In the following, we will show that the bid values
of the bidders are blind for both the auctioneer and the
agent.
Theorem 2 Our auction mechanism for identicalitems guarantees bid privacy.
Proof In our auction mechanism for identical
items, the auctioneer can only obtain the encrypted bids
of the bidders and the payments of the winners. Without
the decryption key, the auctioneer cannot derive any
other information from these encrypted bids. The
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auctioneer knows the payments of the winners but
cannot construct the equations among them since the
auctioneer does not know exactly which variables are
involved in these equations, i.e., the auctioneer cannot
determine which value is larger than the other in the
payment equations. Thus, the bid values of the bidders
can be well preserved from the auctioneer.
The agent holds the decryption key but has no direct
access to the encrypted bids. According to our auction
mechanism, the agent will receive many encrypted bids
or bid sums which are masked by random numbers.
Assume that the number of bids or bid sums received
by the agent is n. With these bids or bid sums, the agent
can build n functions that contain no less than n C 2
bids, bid sums, or random numbers. Since the number
of variables is larger than the number of functions,
the agent cannot decrypt any true bid values of the
bidders. Furthermore, the payment of each winner is
also considered. Note that the IDs of the bidders are
permutated by the auctioneer. Thus, the agent cannot
map the payment equation to each winner with the
auction results, indicating that the true bid values of the
bidders are blind for the agent.
In conclusion, the bids of the bidders are blind to
both the auctioneer and the agent. That is, our auction
mechanism for identical-items guarantees bid privacy.


4

Combinatorial
Auction
Mechanism
Design with Privacy Preservation (CAMP)

In this section, we propose a CAMP design, which
also achieves strategyproofness and maximizes social
efficiency. Compared with IAMP, CAMP not only
protects the true bid values of the bidders, but also
preserves the demands of the losers.
4.1

Bidding

Like the bidding process in IAMP, the agent first
generates encryption and decryption keys of Paillier’s
cryptosystem,
pand publishes the EK. Then, each bidder
encrypts bi = jci j using the EK of the agent and sends
the results to the auctioneer. However, all the bidders
not only want to protect their own bids in our CA
model, but also want to hide the items that they want
to buy if they lose in the auction. Thus, each bidder
will also encrypt the targeted set of items. Let Xi D
fxi;1 ; xi;2 ; :::; xi;h g be the demand vector of bidder i ,
where xi;j D 1 if Ij 2 ci , otherwise xi;j D 0: For
each xi;j , bidder i generates a random integer r and

Tsinghua Science and Technology, April 2017, 22(2): 119–134

encrypts xi;j using
p the EK of the agent. Finally, bidder
i sends .E.bi = jci j/; E.Xi // to the auctioneer, where
E.Xi / D fE.xi;1 /; E.xi;2 /; :::; E.xi;h /g.
Table 2 shows an example of the demand and
encrypted demand of the bidders when h D 5.
4.2

Allocation mechanism

After receiving the encrypted bids and demands from
the bidders, the auctioneer selects a set of bidders
as winners if the social efficiency is maximized. It
has been proven in Ref. [17] that the social efficiency
maximization problem in the combinatorial auction is
NP-hard, and the upper bound of approximation
ratios
p
of the polynomial time algorithms is h.
Dong et al. proposed an auction mechanism with a
greedy allocation mechanism in Ref. [17], which
p can
approximate the optimal one within a factor of h. We
briefly describe this mechanism below:
bi
for each bid bi is
 First, a normalized bid p
jci j
calculated, and then the bidders are sorted according
to the non-increasing order of the normalized bids.
 Next, the greedy allocation mechanism examines
every bidder in the sorted list sequentially, and grants
the bidder only if his demand does not overlap with
all the demands of the previously granted bidders.
 Assume l.i / is the first bidder following i in the
sorted list that has been denied but has been granted
were it not for the presence of i . Then, bidder i
pays zero if his bid p
is denied or l.i / does not exist;
otherwise, he pays jci j  nl.i / , where nl.i / is the
normalized bid of bidder l.i /.
Following the CA mechanism stated above, only two
operations rely on the true bid values of the bidders:
sorting the bidders according to their normalized bids
and computing the payment for each winner i using the
normalized bid of l.i /. Thus, we can similarly perform
the same steps in IAMP to protect the bid privacy of the
bidders. However, the agent needs to know the demand
vectors of all the bidders to check if they overlap with
each other in the combinatorial auction. Therefore,
the most challenging issue of designing privacyTable 2
Bidder
1
2
...
m

The demand and encrypted demand of bidders.
Demand
f1; 0; 1; 0; 0g
f0; 1; 0; 0; 1g
...
f1; 1; 0; 1; 0g

Encrypted demand
fE.1/; E.0/; E.1/; E.0/; E.0/g
fE.0/; E.1/; E.0/; E.0/; E.1/g
...
fE.1/; E.1/; E.0/; E.1/; E.0/g
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preserving CA mechanism is to protect the demand
of the losers. To manage this challenge, we encrypt
the demand vector of the bidders. More specifically,
we confuse the ID of the bidders and the ID of the
items by separately using permutations 1 W Zm ! Zm
and 2 W Zh ! Zh , before the auctioneer sends the
demand vectors to the agent. With the confused
information and decryption key, the agent can also
obtain the overlapping information of the bidders, but
can barely map them to the true demands of the
losers. Furthermore, the auctioneer is only provided
the encrypted demand vectors and the auction result but
has no idea about the demands of each loser. Then, the
demands privacy of the losers is protected. The detail
of our allocation mechanism with privacy preservation
is shown in Algorithm 4.
4.3

Payment calculation mechanism

Recall that an auction is strategyproof if and only if
it is bid-monotone and always charges each winner
its critical value. For each winner i in the greedy
Algorithm 4
Allocation mechanism for combinatorial
auction
1: The auctioneer randomly picks two integers ı1 2 Z21012 ,
ı2 2 Z21022 , executes the following homomorphic
bi
operation, and then sends f1 .i /; E.ı1 p
C ı2 /;
jci j
fE.xi;j /; 2 .j /gIj 2I gi 2B to the agent.
bi
bi ı1
E.ı1 p
C ı2 / D E. p
/ E.ı2 /:
jci j
jci j
2:

3:

4:
5:
6:
7:
8:
9:
10:
11:
12:
13:
14:

The agent decrypts the set of bids fE.ı1 pbjci j C ı2 /gi2B by
i
using the private key, and reorders them in the descending
order:
b.1/
b.m/
ı1 p
C ı2 ; :::; ı1 p
C ı2 ;
jc.1/ j
jc.m/ j
where
b.1/
b.m/
> ::: > p
:
p
jc.1/ j
jc.m/ j
The agent decrypts the demand of bidders and computes the
winners as follows:
Set W D B
for i D 1 to m do
Set j D 1
while j 6 h and  .i / 2 W do
P 1
if x.i/;j D 1 and ikD1
x.k/;j > 1 then
Set W D W n f .i /g
end if
Set j D j C 1
end while
end for
The agent sends the set W of winners to the auctioneer.
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allocation mechanism, the normalized bid isplarger than
the normalized bid of l.i /. Thus, nl.i /  jci j is the
critical value of winner i if l.i / exists. Otherwise,
the critical value of winner i is zero. Our payment
calculation mechanism is shown in Algorithm 5.
4.4

Security analysis

Theorem 3 Our combinatorial auction mechanism
protects the demand ci of each loser i .
Proof Since the demand vectors of the bidders
are encrypted and the auctioneer does not have the
decryption key, the auctioneer cannot retrieve anything
from the encrypted vectors. Moreover, the agent only
sends the demand vectors of the winners to the
auctioneer. Thus, the auctioneer has no means to access
the true demands of the losers. For the agent, he can
decrypt the demand vector of any bidder but cannot
determine the exact demand of each loser i since the
real relationships between items and the IDs of the
bidders are permutated by permutation functions, which
are only possessed by the auctioneer. Therefore, we can
conclude that our CA mechanism protects the demands
of the losers.

Theorem 4 Our CA mechanism guarantees bid
privacy.
Proof Without loss of generality, let us consider
the bid bi of bidder i . The auctioneer
p canpobtain
the encrypted bid E.bi / and pi D bl.i / jci j= jcl.i / j
for each winner i . Since bi has been encrypted, the
auctioneer cannot retrieve any information from E.bi /.
Moreover, the auctioneer does not know which items
each loser bids for and has no idea which bidder is l.i/
of winner i . Thus, the auctioneer cannot find the bid
value of any bidder from each pi .
Although the agent possesses the decryption key,
he cannot directly access the encrypted bids as the
encrypted bids are masked by the auctioneer using
random numbers, before they are sent to the agent. With
Algorithm 5 Payment calculation for combinatorial auction
1: For each winner i 2 W , the agent finds l.i/ and computes
pi0 as follows:
(
b
ı1 p l.i / C ı2 ; if l.i/ existI
0
jcl.i / j
pi D
0;
otherwise:
2:
3:

The agent sends the set fpi0 ; Xi ; .i/gi2W to the auctioneer.
The auctioneer computes the payment for each winner as
follows:
p
pi D max. jci j.pi0 ı2 /=ı1 ; 0/:
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the masked bids, the agent can build m functions with
m encrypted bids and two random numbers. Since
the number of variables is greater than the number of
functions, the agent cannot decrypt any true bid values
of the bidders. The payment pi of each winner i is
available to the agent. However, the IDs and the demand
vectors of the bidders are disrupted by the auctioneer.
Thus, the agent does not know l.i / either. That is, the
agent still cannot determine the bid value of any bidder
using the pi ’s.
In conclusion, our CA mechanism guarantees bid
privacy.


1.00
0.99
Social eﬃciency ratio

Simulation Results

In this section, we present our evaluation results and
the performance analysis of our auction mechanisms,
including the auction performance and the cost of
computation and communication.
Auction performance

We first introduce two major metrics to evaluate the
performance of the auction mechanism, namely social
efficiency ratio and revenue ratio.
 Social efficiency ratio: the social efficiency ratio is
defined as the ratio between the social efficiency
of our approximation mechanism and the optimal
mechanism.
 Revenue ratio: the revenue for an auction is the
total payment received from all winners, that is,
the ratio between the revenue of our approximation
mechanism and the optimal mechanism. However, it
is challenging to obtain the optimal revenue. Thus,
we use the optimal social efficiency instead of the
optimal revenue in our simulation, which is an upper
bound of the optimal revenue.
In our simulation, we assume the bid values of
the bidders are randomly distributed in the range
Œ0; 10 000, and the number of items that each bidder
wants to buy is randomly distributed in the range
Œ1; Nmax , where Nmax is the maximum number of items
that each bidder can bid. In each set of evaluations,
we vary one factor among the bidder number, items
number, and Nmax , while fixing the other two factors.
In our CA0 model, we first randomly generate a number
Ni from Œ1; Nmax  for each bidder i, and then randomly
choose Ni items from the item set I as bidder i ’s
demand ci .
Since one of the important goals of the auction design
is to maximize the social efficiency, we first evaluate the
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5.1

social efficiency ratio of our approximation algorithms.
As shown in Fig. 2, the social efficiency ratio increases
with the number of bidders in both the IAMP and
CAMP mechanisms. Theoretically, both the weights
of the optimal solution and that of our approximation
solution should increase with the bidder number and
the number of items. However, we find an interesting
result: the social efficiency ratio decreases with the
increasing number of the items in CAMP. One possible
reason is that, when the number of items increase,
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Fig. 2 Social efficiency ratio of the proposed approximation
algorithms.
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the optimal social efficiency increases faster than the
approximation solution in CAMP, but increases slower
than the approximation solution in other cases. We
fix the number of bidders and items, and increase the
maximum number of items that each bidder wants to
buy, as shown in Fig. 2c. Due to the demands of the
bidders being inseparable, the social efficiency ratio
curve of the IA model declines with increasing Nmax
in Fig. 2c. However, in the CA model, more items
are sold to bidders with high bid values and the social
efficiency ratio increases with increasing Nmax . Besides,
we can also learn from Fig. 2 that our approximation
algorithms perform much better than the theoretical
values, especially for the IA model.
In addition, we also compare the social efficiency
of CAMP with a greedy mechanism. This greedy
mechanism first sorts the bids of the bidders in
descending order, and then scans the bidders oneby-one to decide which bidder wins the auction, as
we did in CAMP. The simulation result is shown in
Fig. 3. Obviously, CAMP has better performance than
the greedy mechanism. This is mainly because the
proposed CAMP sorts the bidders according to their
normalized bids, while the greedy mechanism sorts the
bidders according to their bids. Thus, the unit bid value
of the winners in CAMP is larger than that in the greedy
mechanism, which can lead to greater social efficiency.
The revenue ratios of our approximation algorithms
are described in Fig. 4. Since we charge each
winner their respective critical value in our auction
mechanisms, then theoretically, the total payment
for winners should increase when the competitive
rate increases. Conversely, the competitive rate is
affected by the bidder number, item number, and
Nmax . Basically, our evaluation results corroborate the
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Fig. 4 Revenue ratio of the proposed approximation
algorithms.
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theoretical analysis. However, due to the similar reason
as that provided for the social efficiency ratio, the
performance of the revenue ratio decreases with the
increasing number of items in CAMP, while performing
opposite in IAMP.
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Fig. 3 Social efficiency of the CAMP and the comparison
greedy algorithm (Nmax D 12/.

Computation and communication overhead

We evaluate the computation and communication
overhead of our approximation algorithms. Since
computation overhead is dominated by the auctioneer
and the agent in both auction models, we do not
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consider the bidders’ computation overhead. As shown
in Fig. 5, the auctioneer spends more time in the
IA model than in the CA model. This is because
the auctioneer spends most of his time computing the
payments from the winners. However, we can easily
find them in the CA model.
The run-time of each bidder is roughly 30 ms in the
IA model. However, bidders need to encrypt their bids
and demands in the CA model. Thus, the run time of the
agent or a bidder is related to the number of items in the
combinatorial auction. Our simulation results show that
9
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Fig. 5 Computation and communication overhead when
h D 5.

the run time of each bidder is roughly 180 ms in CAMP
when h D 5, and the run-time of the agent is greater in
IAMP.
In the evaluation, we set n to be of 1024-bit length.
Figure 5c shows the communication overhead of our
auction mechanisms with privacy preservation. It is
found that the communication overhead of CAMP is
much higher than that of IAMP. The main reason is that
bidders encrypt only their bids in the IA, but encrypt
both their bids and demands in the CA.
5.3

Comparison with prior state-of-art work

To show superiority of the proposed mechanisms, we
compare the performance of our work with prior work
in Ref. [19], and further prove that our mechanisms
perform better than the mechanisms in Ref. [19].
First, we consider the performance of social
efficiency. The IA model studied in this work is similar
to the auction model stated in Ref. [19]. However, the
optimal allocation problem studied in Ref. [19] can be
solved in polynomial time, which is easier than ours.
The CA models studied in our work and Ref. [19] are
identical. It has been proven that the optimal allocation
problem of the CA model is NP-hard. However,
Ref. [19] proposed a privacy-preserving mechanism for
the optimal allocation, but not for the approximation
allocation. Thus, the proposed mechanism of Ref. [19]
for the CA model cannot be solved in polynomial time
either. Moreover, in the auction mechanism design,
there are two procedures to be addressed. The first is the
allocation mechanism design and the second is payment
calculation. The work of Ref. [19] concentrates on the
privacy-preserving allocation mechanism design, so the
payment calculation is not mentioned.
Then, we compare the performance of privacy
preservation. We proved that our mechanisms can
protect the bid privacy of bidders if the auctioneer does
not collude with the agent. There are three parties in
Ref. [19], namely the weight publisher, the evaluator,
and the mask publisher. The proposed mechanism can
protect the bid privacy of the bidders when no more than
tw evaluators and tm mask publishers collude with each
other. Note that the number of evaluators is no less than
the possible maximal bid value, i.e., there are at least
1000 evaluators if the maximal bid is 1000. There is
only one auctioneer and one agent in our mechanisms;
thus, the privacy preservation of our mechanisms is
easier to achieve than the mechanisms proposed in
Ref. [19].
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For the performance of communication overhead,
the communication overhead of our mechanisms is
O.m/ for the IA model and O.mh/ for the CA
model, where m is the number of bidders and
h is the number of goods. The communication
overhead of the mechanisms proposed in Ref. [19]
is O.e .l C .tm C 1/  .log e C l C n log e///, where
l D mh, e is the number of evaluators, tm C 1 is
the number of mask publishers, and each bidder will
submit the fraction of bid to n evaluators. Clearly, the
communication overhead of our mechanism is lower
than the mechanisms proposed in Ref. [19].

6

Literature Review

Many solutions have been proposed in previous
literature to address the scarcity problem of the limited
resources, such as radio spectrum, emissions permits,
and airport landing slots. The auction has been shown
to be one of the most effective methods among all
the solutions. However, most studies on auctions
(e.g., Refs. [3, 4, 20–22]) only allow bidders to bid
a single item in one round of the auction. There
are only a few researchers who have considered the
case that each bidder can bid for multiple items.
Huang et al.[23] proposed an auction mechanism, in
which all participants could exchange multi-unit items.
Wurman et al.[24] designed an auction mechanism which
transforms the buyers’ multi-unit items demand to a
single-unit transaction. Babaioff and Walsh[25] studied
a budget-balanced and strategy-proof double auction
mechanism, where each buyer desires for a bundle of
items. Chu and Shen[26] proposed an asymptotically
efficient strategyproof auction mechanism, namely
BC-LP, which achieved bundling of commodities
transactions for buyers. Combinatorial auction[15, 27]
allowing bidders to bid for packages of items has
been widely studied in various research fields recently,
such as cloud computing, spectrum auction, etc. The
authors in Ref. [28] introduced combinatorial auctionbased allocation mechanisms for the virtual machine
allocation problem of cloud computing. Dong et al.[17]
applied a combinatorial spectrum auction model with
time-frequency flexibility in cognitive radio networks.
However, none of these auction mechanisms provided
any guarantee on privacy preservation.
Several sealed-bid auction mechanisms with privacy
preservation have been proposed in previous studies.
For instance, Refs. [8, 9] are works about the first-
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price or second-price auction mechanism design, which
protect the bid values of bidders. In Refs. [10,
29–34], a second central party, called an “auction
issuer”, “auction authority”, or “agent” in addition to
the auctioneer, was introduced to the auction. These
works model this second central party as a trusted
or semi-trusted party, which communicates with the
auctioneer to make the winner decision and to compute
the payment from winners while protecting the privacy
of the bidders. Brandt and Sandholm[35–38] focused
on the design of unconditional full privacy auction
protocols, which relies neither on a trusted third-party,
nor on any computational intractability assumptions.
Although these protocols are fully privacy-preserving,
the computational and communication complexities
are relatively high. Brandt and Sandholm[39] also
designed secure mechanisms for three common types
of multi-unit auctions: uniform-price, discriminatory,
and the generalized Vickrey auctions. In Ref. [12], a
secure combinatorial spectrum auction was designed
using homomorphic encryption to deal with the
untrustworthy auctioneer. In Ref. [19], several secure
combinatorial auction mechanisms were proposed with
dynamic programming via polynomial secret sharing.
Unfortunately, the optimal allocation problem in most
practical auctions is NP-hard, especially in multi-unit
auctions. None of the existing solutions with privacy
preservation have provided any performance guarantee,
such as maximizing the social efficiency. In this work,
we tackle this problem to design strategyproof and
privacy-preserving auction mechanisms that maximize
social efficiency.

7

Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed the first strategyproof
and privacy-preserving multi-unit auction mechanisms
that maximize social efficiency. We study two
cases for multi-unit auctions, where the items in
the market are identical and distinct. Under these
two cases, the optimal item allocation problem is
NP-hard to solve. Thus, we designed secure and
near optimal allocation mechanisms for each case,
which
have the approximation factors of 2 and
p
h, respectively. Furthermore, we also computed the
critical payment with privacy preservation for each
winner, and theoretically proved the properties of our
auction mechanisms, such as strategyproofness, privacy
preservation, and approximation factor. Additionally,
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although the privacy-preserving design has incurred
some computation and communication overheads, the
auction mechanisms are still efficient. Our evaluation
results demonstrated that our protocols not only achieve
good social efficiency, but also perform well in
computation and communication aspects.
Hence, we believe that this is the first study of multiunit auction mechanisms with performance guarantee
and privacy preservation; however, there are several
interesting questions left for future work. The first
is to study the case when the bidder’s demands are
separable, and their per unit bids are related to the
number of identical items they win in the auction. The
second is to design strategyproof and privacy preserving
auction mechanisms when bidders can bid on multicombinatorial items, but only want to buy one of the
items in the combinatorial auction.
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